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The Roles of Higher Education in the
Democratization of Politics in Africa:
Survey Reports from HERANA1
Robert Mattes* & Thierry M. Luescher-Mamashela**
Abstract
Against the theory on the nexus of higher education and citizenship, this
article brings together the main findings and conclusions of three related
studies with African mass publics, parliamentarians from African legisla-
tures, and students from three African flagship universities, conducted by
the Higher Education Research and Advocacy Network in Africa (HERANA).
The article shows that higher education provides advantages in various
measures of democratic citizenship and leadership. It plays important roles
with regard to access to political information, information gathering skills,
and levels of political knowledge; the ability to offer opinions and critical
perspectives on politics and the economy; and levels of democratic values
and democratic action. Moreover, university-educated MPs seem to make
much better sense of the unique complexities of legislatures and their mul-
tiple competing functions than their less educated peers. This might reflect
the knowledge and analytic skills acquired through higher education, the
fact that universities are themselves highly complex institutions that they
needed to negotiate as students, and the finding that students acquire ex-
tensive organisational leadership experience while at university. In light of
this, the article suggests that higher education can play a crucial role in the
democratisation of politics in Africa by developing “institution-builders” for
state and civil society.
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Résumé
S’appuyant sur la théorie de la relation entre l’enseignement supérieur et la
citoyenneté, cet article rassemble les conclusions principales de trois études
liées effectuées par le Réseau de Recherche et de Plaidoyer sur
l’Enseignement supérieur en Afrique (Higher Education Research and Ad-
vocacy Network in Africa – HERANA). Ces études avaient pour sujets le
public de masse africain, des membres de parlements nationaux africains, et
finalement, les étudiants de trois universités africaines de premier ordre.
L’article démontre qu’une éducation supérieure offre des avantages de na-
ture variée à la citoyenneté et au leadership démocratiques. En effet, elle joue
un rôle important en matière d’accès aux informations politiques, les
compétences dans la collecte d’informations et le niveau de connaissance
politique, la capacité d’offrir une opinion et des points de vue critiques sur la
politique et l’économie, et différents niveaux de valeurs et d’actions
démocratiques. De plus, les parlementaires qui ont un diplôme d’université
semblent se débrouiller beaucoup mieux dans les méandres uniques des
assemblées législatives et leurs multiples fonctions opposées que leurs
collègues moins éduqués. Il est possible que cela soit du aux connaissances
et aux talents d’analyse acquis dans l’éducation supérieure, ou bien au fait
que les universités sont elles-mêmes des institutions très complexes, qu’il
faut maîtriser lors de ses études, en plus de l’acquisition de grands talents
d’organisation nécessaires aux étudiants pendant qu’ils sont à l’université.
Par conséquent, l’article suggère que l’enseignement supérieur peut jouer
un rôle crucial dans la démocratisation de la politique en Afrique en
encourageant l’émergence d’individus qui vont renforcer les institutions
d’État et de la société civile.
Introduction
Because democracy requires democrats, it is said to require a critical mass
of educated people who believe in and support democracy, and who have
the cognitive skills that enable them to act as critical citizens: sceptical of
government, tolerant and trusting of other citizens, and engaged in the demo-
cratic process. These arguments date at least back to Thomas Jefferson,
but have since been forcefully articulated by other thinkers such as Alexis
de Tocqueville, John Stuart Mill and John Dewey. Indeed, this understand-
ing was part and parcel of the movement toward mass public schooling in
the United States and subsequently in Europe. More recently, scholars of
democracy, public opinion and political behaviour have continued to echo
this basic argument and specified it more explicitly. At minimum, education
has been argued to increase society-wide literacy levels, enabling larger
proportions of the electorate to follow politics by reading newspapers. Edu-
cation is also believed to stimulate greater political interest and discussion,
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possession of basic facts about government and the internalization of demo-
cratic norms, as well as to enable people to acquire and interpret new infor-
mation in a more critical manner. Finally, education is hypothesized to trans-
late into improved communication and organizational skills that enable people
to persuade and mobilize others (for an overview see Nie, Junn and Stehlik-
Barry 1996). All of this is believed to translate into higher levels of political
efficacy, which in turn leads to specific actions such as joining civil society
organizations, contacting elected representatives and other government of-
ficials, working with other citizens and participating in community action
groups, tolerating political opponents, refraining from violent protest, and
ultimately supporting democracy and defending it if it comes under threat.
Most of these arguments have been corroborated repeatedly by empiri-
cal social science. While some scholars may have concluded that relatively
educated democratic polities may not always have possessed sufficient
amounts of the postulated ‘correct’ information or made the ‘correct’ con-
nections between various beliefs and attitudes (Berelson, Lazafeld and
McPhee 1954; Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes 1960; Converse and
Dupeux 1972), or correctly applied abstract democratic principles to spe-
cific cases (Prothro and Grigg 1960; McCloskey and Brill 1983; and see
Sullivan and Transue, 1999, for an excellent summary), empirical social sci-
entists have repeatedly confirmed this basic thesis at the micro-level. Moreo-
ver, education has repeatedly been shown to be an important predictor of
voting in the United States (Verba and Nie 1972; Wolfinger and Rosenstone
1980; Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995; Milligan, Moretti and Oreopoulos
2004; Dee 2004) as well as in many other Western countries (Lipset 1960;
Norris 2002; Dalton 2008a), though there are exceptions, often in countries
with strong socialist parties that mobilize less educated working class voters
(Powell 1986; Norris 2002; Milligan et al 2004). Education has also been
confirmed as a strong predictor of other citizen qualities such as interest in
politics, newspaper readership, political knowledge, interpersonal trust, tol-
erance of political opponents, and a wide range of forms of political partici-
pation, such as contacting elected leaders, joining community associations,
attending community meetings, political internet activism, and protest both in
the United States (Hyman, Wright and Reed 1978; Hyman and Wright 1979;
Bobo and Licari 1989; Verba et al 1995; Putnam 1995; Brady, Verba and
Schlozman 1996; Nie et al 1996; and Burns, Schlozman and Verba 2001;
Dee 2004; Dalton 2008a and 2008b) and other democracies in Europe and
Latin America (Verba, Nie and Kim 1978; Milner 2002; Milligan, Moretti
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and Oreopoulos 2004; Belucci, Maraffi and Segatti 2006; Magalhaes 2008;
Dalton 2008). In a 1996 summary, Nie et al. concluded:
The notion that formal educational attainment is the primary mechanism
behind citizenship characteristics is basically uncontested …. Formal edu-
cation is almost without exception the strongest factor in explaining what
citizens do in politics and how they think about politics. (Nie et al 1996:2)
Education’s impact is so regularly found that political scientist Philip Con-
verse (1972) once called it the ‘universal solvent’ of political participation
(cited in Dee 2004:1700).
Scholarly arguments about the education-citizenship nexus in the ‘old’
democracies of advanced industrialized societies are really about the link
between education and the quality of democracy. In contrast, in new de-
mocracies in developing countries – such as in much of sub-Saharan Africa
– scholarly arguments about the education-citizenship nexus are less about
the link between education and the quality of democracy; rather, arguments
in our context pertain much more directly to questions about the onset and
very survivability of democracy, along with its quality. The existing literature
again bears out the importance of education. Education has been shown to
increase voter turnout and civic engagement in several different developing
world contexts (Verba, Nie and Kim 1978; Anderson and Dodd 2005; Belucci,
Maraffi and Segatti 2006; Magalhaes 2008; Lam and Kuan 2008). More
importantly, education has proved to be a very strong predictor of popular
support for democracy in places like Korea, Chile, Eastern Europe, Russia
and in many countries of sub-Saharan Africa (Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer
1998; Shin 1999; Markowski 2005; Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi 2005;
Rose, Mishler and Munro 2006; Mattes and Bratton 2007).
A less frequently appreciated parallel to the linkage between education
and democratic citizenship is the connection between education and demo-
cratic leadership. That is, democracy also requires a smaller, but nonethe-
less critical mass of educated elites who not only believe in democracy but
also have the cognitive skills that enable them to run the complex institutions
of modern democracy, primarily elected legislatures and executive depart-
ments, as well as regulatory agencies, courts and police, and political parties
and civil society organizations. Institutional leaders and senior staff are re-
quired to master complex documents and must often play multiple and com-
peting roles. Effective democratic institutions have to establish internal struc-
tures and procedures to enable them to perform core functions and manage
their often inherent tensions and contradictions, thus bringing a semblance
of predictability and certainty to the government process. Thus, while it may
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not require it, effective institutionalization is certainly assisted by the
types of cognitive skills acquired through formal education, especially
higher education.
Because developed societies rarely lack a sufficiently large critical mass
of educated elites, scholars in these contexts often fail to address this issue.
Or, if they do, they do so for very different purposes. For example, there has
been a large amount of descriptive research on the social background of
democratic legislators under the rubric of ‘legislative recruitment’, but few
studies have focused specifically on the impact of formal education per se
(for reviews of this literature see Mathews 1985; Norris 1997a). To the
extent that scholars ever use education as an explanatory variable, they
have focused on whether it helps potential candidates get into the legislature
in the first place, not on what they do once they get there (see Norris 1997b).
In a developing society, however, it is an important question whether the
education system is producing a sufficient mass of people able to run and
staff the range of institutions critical to the functioning of modern democ-
racy. To our knowledge, there have been few empirical studies in this area
since the 1960s (e.g. Coleman 1965), though Barkan (2009) and his col-
leagues have recently collected some initial descriptive data on the educa-
tional background of African legislators. Nevertheless, the applicability of
the ‘education for democracy’ argument in the developing world in general
and across different African polities in particular has received support from
a series of macro-level studies that have demonstrated both cross-national
linkages (countries with higher aggregate levels of education have higher
levels of democracy) and more importantly, over-time linkages (developing
non-democracies with increasing levels of education were much more likely
to become democracies than those within stagnant or declining levels of
education), effects that are independent of other factors such as levels of
national wealth (Lipset 1959; Barro 1999; Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes and Schleifer 2004). While some analysts argued that the correla-
tion was a spurious reflection of larger historic economic and political devel-
opment paths that simultaneously increased both education and democracy
(Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson and Yared 2005), further analysis re-affirmed
this link by examining longer-term lags of education on democratization and
through better statistical controls for the mutual correlations amongst previ-
ous levels of education and democracy and their over-time persistence
(Glaeser, Ponzetto and Schleifer 2007; Bobba and Coviello 2007; Papaioannou
and Siourounis 2008; Castello-Climent 2008).
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Micro-level studies conducted in old democracies almost always reflect
attitudinal differences between university graduates and high school drop-
outs (after statistically controlling for other relevant factors) and therefore
do not explicitly examine the specific impact of higher education. A few
studies that have been done so have found that the impact of education on
certain measures of citizenship is not linear but increases once one enters
university. There is ample evidence that the university experience has a
range of unique social and developmental impacts (see Pascarella and
Terenzini 1995). Putnam (1995:667), for example, found that the relation-
ship between education and civic engagement was curvilinear with advanc-
ing returns as education increased. In particular:
The last two years of college make twice as much difference to trust and
group membership as the first two years of high school. The four years of
education between 14 and 18 total years have ten times more impact on trust
and membership than the first four years of formal education. (Putnam
1995:667 emphasis in the original)
Dee (2004) also finds similar effects of college entrance on voter registra-
tion, voting and volunteering. And Dalton (2008) has shown that university
education, when combined with high levels of political interest, makes an
important and unique contribution to the way in which voters relate to politi-
cal parties and election campaigns.
Looking at related studies on this nexus in new democracies, it is not at
all clear whether the measured impacts of education reflects the impor-
tance of higher education, or more simply, the difference between second-
ary versus primary, or no schooling. On one hand, one of the best empirical
studies of democratic transition in sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s demon-
strates that it was internal protest (rather than pressure from external forces,
like the international financial institutions), often driven by university stu-
dents, that was the key factor which brought down autocratic leaders across
the continent (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997). And Barkan and his col-
leagues (2009) found that university-trained MPs formed the core of the
cross-party coalitions that have initiated key reforms in some African legis-
latures. Read together, the two studies could well be seen as evidence of
important role of highly educated Africans in the democratic transitions and
consolidation of democracy on the continent. On the other hand, while Bratton,
Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi’s study of public opinion in 12 sub-Saharan Afri-
can countries (2005) found a strong impact of education, it did not specifi-
cally examine the impacts of different levels of education.
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Evans and Rose (2007) attempted to assess the differing impacts of
various levels of education in Malawi by creating a series of ‘dummy’ vari-
ables (i.e. variables that take either the value of 0 or 1) for different levels of
schooling (primary, secondary, post-secondary). They found that each level
of education made a statistically significant contribution to popular support
for democracy in that country. While this is encouraging, the finding is less
than conclusive since standard dummy variable analysis is designed to com-
pare a series of wholly discrete nominal categories with no overlapping or
cumulative content to a referent group (in this case, those with no school-
ing). But education is different. While each category certainly contains a
discrete set of respondents, the concept is not discrete. The effect of being
in secondary school, when compared to having no schooling, also includes
the effect of having been in primary school; and the effect of post-second-
ary and higher education when compared to those with no schooling also
includes the impacts of both primary and secondary schooling. Indeed, as
Evans and Rose’s (2007b) models become more fully specified, the unique
contribution of higher education to support for democracy diminishes
rapidly.
The Higher Education and Democracy Studies of HERANA
It is in this theoretical context of strong and positive findings about the im-
pact of education in general, and higher education in particular, on democ-
racy in developed societies, but inconsistent and uncertain findings in the
developing world, and particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, that the Higher
Education Research and Advocacy Network in Africa (HERANA) con-
ducted a series of three studies to examine differing aspects of the role of
higher education in the democratisation of politics in Africa.2
The first study by Mattes and Mughogho (2009) used Afrobarometer
survey data collected in 2005-2006 in 18 different countries of Central, East,
Southern, and West Africa, to assess whether university educated citizens
of varying ages were any more engaged with and supportive of the demo-
cratic process than less educated citizens.3 The study started by unpacking
the set of factors that Bratton et al (2005) called ‘cognitive awareness’ and
attempted to isolate the discrete contribution of formal education in general,
and higher education in particular, to each of these other factors. Second, it
examined the impact of education on a much wider range of facets of demo-
cratic citizenship than previous studies using Afrobarometer data by looking
at: (1) rates of political participation, (2) the ability to formulate political
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opinions, (3) basic democratic values, and (4) the willingness to offer critical
performance evaluations.
The general applicability of the Afrobarometer findings about higher edu-
cation might be limited if the political attitudes and behaviours of current
university students differ in any systematic way from their older compatri-
ots. Thus, the second HERANA study led by Luescher-Mamashela and
involving teams of researchers and analysts in Kenya, South Africa and
Tanzania, focused on current students at three premier African universities:
the University of Dar es Salaam (UDSM) in Tanzania, the University of
Nairobi (UON) in Kenya, and the University of Cape Town (UCT) in South
Africa (Luescher-Mamashela, Kiiru, Mattes, Mwollo-ntallima, Ng’ethe and
Romo 2011). Surveys were conducted among third-year undergraduate stu-
dents and student leaders in all three universities in 2009, producing a sam-
ple of 400 weighted responses representative by gender and faculty for
each university.4 In addition, data from the latest round of Afrobarometer
surveys (Round 4, 2008) from Kenya, South Africa and Tanzania was used
to compare the students’ responses with those of the general public and the
relevant age cohorts of youth without higher education in each country.5
Thus, this project explored the current role of universities in the formation of
political attitudes and democratic citizenship among students and student
leaders. Because it used identical (yet indigenised) survey instruments across
all three universities, with many questions based on Afrobarometer items, it
was possible to do statistical comparisons across universities as well as
between each set of students, young citizens of the same age but without
higher education, and the mass publics of each country in general (of any
age and educational level). The student surveys focused on students’ atti-
tudes towards democracy, their political behaviour, and their perceptions
and conceptions of politics and governance on campus as well as with re-
spect to national government; in addition, they investigated the relationship
between students’ political engagement and their attitudes towards democ-
racy. The study came to explore, in a wider sense, whether the three univer-
sities respectively provided a condition of a ‘political hothouse’ or of a ‘training
ground’ for democratic citizenship and leadership, and thus serving as ‘sites
of citizenship’.
In the third HERANA study, known as the African Legislatures Project
(ALP), Mattes and Mozaffar (2011) examined the extent to which African
parliaments are composed of university educated members of parliaments
(MPs), and whether university educated legislators approached their job
differently to other legislators. This project therefore explored the ability of
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national systems of higher education to supply the human capital to run the
national legislatures in selected African countries. The study used a combi-
nation of primary and secondary sources, including interviews with MPs. In
their report, Mattes and Mozaffar attempted to subject these broad proposi-
tions to more systematic test, using a unique and original set of data from
surveys of randomly chosen, representative samples national legislators in
eleven countries carried out by ALP between 2008 and 2010.6 The research-
ers asked three broad sets of questions for this data. The first was a simple
descriptive question: What is the overall level of educational attainment (par-
ticularly higher education) amongst African MPs, and how does this vary
across countries? They then move on to two larger explanatory questions.
They investigate, briefly, what national level characteristics might account
for these cross-national variations? They then move on to examine, at greater
depth, the actual political consequences of education amongst African legis-
lators. Do more educated MPs possess different social and political charac-
teristics than less educated ones? And are highly educated MPs, in fact,
more likely to adopt the types of attitudes and behaviours that might expand
the role of representative assemblies in their national political systems, and
thus contribute to the process of democratization (Fish 2006)? Specifically,
they ask whether highly educated MPs are more likely to bring with them
more professional skills and government experience, adopt an ‘institutional-
ist’ role orientation, devote greater proportions of their time to activities that
build legislative institutions, show greater independence from party bosses,
and support legislative reform measures.
Higher Education in Sub-Saharan Africa
The very first thing one needs to take into account when considering the
roles of higher education in the development and consolidation of democ-
racy in Africa is the relative scarcity of highly educated people on the con-
tinent. This is reflected in the Afrobarometer data. Thus, in response to the
question, ‘What is the highest level of education you have completed?’ the
Afrobarometer data reveal that less than one in ten (9%) of the 21,600
adults interviewed across 18 countries in 2005-2006 had advanced beyond
high school, either obtaining post-secondary non-university qualifications or
attending a university. Just 2 per cent said they had actually completed an
undergraduate degree. At the same time, it is also important to consider that
levels of post-secondary education vary widely across countries, ranging
from around one-in-five Nigerians (23%), Zambians (19%), and South Afri-
cans (17%) to less than one in every twenty adults in Lesotho, Madagascar
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and Benin (4% each), Mali and Mozambique (3%) and Malawi and Tanza-
nia (1%). Possession of actual university degrees ranged from 4 per cent in
Nigeria to less than 1 per cent in many countries according to the survey
data. Given the rapid expansion of education systems across the continent
in less than fifty years, the possession of a formal education – as of 2005-
2006 – decreases sharply with age, as well as amongst rural people and
amongst women. (Mattes and Mughogho 2010)
The ALP surveys also looked at highest education attainment but regis-
tered extremely different results. Across 11 of the same countries included
in the Afrobarometer study, voters elected substantially larger proportions
of educated and highly educated legislators: the majority of the randomly
selected samples of MPs (59%) had at least completed an undergraduate
university degree; 19 per cent had completed an undergraduate degree, and
15 per cent had either a post-graduate diploma or honours degree. One-in-
five had a Masters degree (20%) and 3 per cent had doctorates. As illus-
trated in Figure 1, these levels of higher education attainment amongst MPs
are anywhere from 15 to 80 times higher than amongst ordinary citizens in
their respective countries (for details see Mattes and Mozaffar 2011). This
finding in itself tells us something about the ability of political parties to re-
Figure 1: Educational Attainment amongst African MPs and Citizens
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cruit candidates out of the highest social strata in these countries. Further-
more, that so many voters are prepared to vote for candidates with far
higher levels of education than themselves tells us something about the po-
litical culture in these countries and the huge responsibility this political cul-
ture bestows on higher education and its role in the democratisation of poli-
tics in Africa.
Cross-nationally, the highest levels of education were found in Ghana
(where 65% had some sort of post-undergraduate diploma or degree and
almost half had a Masters degree or higher), followed by South Africa (55%),
Nigeria (51%), Uganda (50%), and Kenya (49%). On the other side of the
spectrum, less than one-in-five MPs had postgraduate experience in Ma-
lawi (19%), Mozambique (12%) and Lesotho (7%). Unfortunately, we have
no data with which to assess whether these levels of educational attainment
constitute an advance over time. However, we do know that since 1990 –
the beginning of Africa’s recent wave of democratisation – the proportion
of higher education enrolments has increased in most African countries for
which data is available. It is reasonable to assume that the ALP results also
reflect an upward curve.
Perhaps surprisingly, given the various advantages enjoyed by incum-
bent political parties in Africa, governing parties were no more likely to have
more highly educated MPs than were opposition parties. Moreover, com-
pared to the gender differences in educational attainment amongst the mass
public, we find no statistically significant differences in the level of educa-
tion attained by male and female MPs, neither is there any evidence that
younger or urban-based MPs are any more likely to be highly educated.
There is fairly strong evidence, however, that highly educated MPs are more
likely to come from a professional background, and that they are less likely
to represent geographically far flung constituencies distant from the national
legislature. Highly educated MPs are also more likely to have held a previ-
ous position at some level of national government before they were elected
to parliament, usually by working in a ministry, agency or parastatal. How-
ever, they do not differ with respect to experience in local government.
Finally, highly educated MPs are much less likely to have held any type of
leadership position within their political party than less educated ones. This
begins to set up an interesting paradox. Beyond the cognitive skills devel-
oped through the educational process, highly educated MPs bring with them
greater familiarity with the types of organizational and business skills that
come with higher education and a professional background, as well as greater
familiarity with various facets of national government. However, they have
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no significant advantage in terms of knowledge of, or familiarity with local
level politics, and are at a significant disadvantage when it comes to party
politics. Given the powerful role of political parties in structuring and organ-
izing legislative activities, the very advantages brought by highly educated
MPs in terms of policy relevant expertise might be negated by their com-
parative lack of rootedness in the political parties to which they belong (see
Mattes and Mozaffar 2011).
Higher Education, Information and Information Gathering
To recall, the main arguments about the contribution of education to democ-
racy revolve in the first instance around citizens’ and leaders’ grasp of cru-
cial information, cognitive engagement with the democratic process, and the
ability to gather and process new information, through for example, the news
media. At the mass level, the Afrobarometer study revealed that citizens
with higher levels of formal education did indeed possess far higher levels of
political information (which is defined as the extent to which respondents
were able to correctly answer three questions about the identity of political
leaders, and three questions about their constitutional and governmental sys-
tem). They were also more likely to use news media, thus constantly acquir-
ing new factual information. These impacts remained even after Mattes
and Mughogho (2010) controlled for a range of demographic covariates of
education (such as age, rural-urban status, gender, and levels of household
poverty). However, when these covariates were taken into consideration,
they found that formal education offered no real advantage in terms of in-
creasing citizens’ levels of cognitive engagement (measured as the combi-
nation of political discussion and political interest) or in terms of political
efficacy (i.e. the extent to which people felt they could influence other citi-
zens).
Thus, the most direct impact of formal education in Africa on citizenship
is through the stimulation of news media use and by giving citizens the skills
to accumulate basic facts about the political system through the news me-
dia. This means that formal education may also have an indirect impact on
other elements of democratic citizenship flowing through greater news
media use and higher level of factual knowledge about politics. Conse-
quently, Mattes and Mughogho (2010) examined all subsequent ‘downstream’
effects of education by looking at its combined direct and indirect effects,
calculating a block adjusted R2 estimate for only formal education, news
media use, and political information (which strips out the overall explanatory
contributions of non-cognitive elements of age, gender, urban residence, or
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poverty). They initially found that average rates of news media consump-
tion increased sharply and steadily across all increments of education, in-
cluding higher education. However, they saw the first hints of a limited im-
pact of higher education, with regard to the possession of political information
which also increased sharply with education but levelled off amongst uni-
versity attendees.
And as discussed above, Mattes and Mughogho attempted to isolate the
specific impact of higher education by analyzing only those respondents
with at least a high school education, and then comparing those who never
went beyond high school with those who possessed some form of post sec-
ondary qualification and with those who actually went to university (holding
constant for other covariates of higher education). Once this was done, they
found very minimal effects: those who went on to university education were
only slightly more likely to use news media or know basic facts about the
political system than ordinary school-leavers. And because these weak re-
lationships meant that higher education was likely to have little indirect im-
pact on democratic citizenship through increased news media use or politi-
cal information (or for that matter, through increased cognitive engagement
or efficacy), all subsequent analyses focused only on the direct impacts of
higher education (holding constant news media use, political information,
cognitive engagement and efficacy, as well as age, rural/urban location, gen-
der and poverty).
The Afrobarometer study also examined whether education facilitated
increased citizen ‘articulateness’ (defined simply as the ability to provide
answers to survey questions). Mattes and Mughogho (2010) found, after
controlling for associated variables, that formal education indeed substan-
tially increased respondents’ ability to offer opinions to fieldresearchers on a
range of issues of political and economic performance. Taken together, higher
levels of education, news media use, and political information enhanced citi-
zens’ ability to offer (positive or negative) opinions about the performance
of the political system, preferences about democracy versus alternative re-
gimes, and a range of social and political values, as well as provide some
meaning to the word ‘democracy’. However, the authors again observed a
curvilinear trend: that is, respondents’ ability to provide fieldresearchers with
evaluations of political and economic performance rose sharply across in-
creasing levels of education until one graduated from high school, or ob-
tained some form of non-university post-secondary qualification, but lev-
elled off after that. Indeed, multivariate analysis demonstrated that higher
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education made no significant contribution to respondents’ ability to offer
opinions on these matters (see Table 1).
In contrast to the Afrobarometer study which examined respondents of vary-
ing ages who might have attended university several years ago, the surveys
by Luescher-Mamashela et al (2011) focused on current students, many of
whom have grown up in a context of democratic governance, a modern
educational system and with the advantages of access to new information
and communication technologies. On the one hand, Luescher-Mamashela
and his colleagues found that the students at the universities of Cape Town,
Dar es Salaam and Nairobi were not necessarily more interested in politics
than their fellow citizens (as measured by Afrobarometer Round 4 results);
on the other hand, the three student surveys clearly indicate that the stu-
dents in all three universities discussed politics far more frequently than
either their fellow citizens in general, or youth of the same age cohort but
without higher education of their respective country. Students also use a
great diversity of news media (radio, television, newspapers and internet) at
a level at least equal to or above that of their respective mass publics
(Luescher-Mamashela et al. 2011).
While UCT students read newspapers at about the same rate as South
Africans in general, or their cohort of 20-23 year olds with no higher educa-
tion, newspaper readership at Dar Es Salaam and Nairobi universities far
outpaces that of their respective national publics or less educated age
cohorts. Moreover, despite the mushrooming of internet cafes across the
countries, internet use as news media remains almost entirely a student
privilege: eight-in-ten students at all the three universities say they have
access to and use the internet daily or several times a week, compared to
just one-in-ten ordinary citizens in their respective country. Even among the
Table 1: Formal Education, Cognitive Awareness and Articulateness
 At Least Some University 
(0-1)b 
Total Adjusted R2 “Block R2“ N 
Able to Offer Opinions on Government Performance -.284* .037 .000 4686 
Able to Offer Meaning of Democracy  -.016NS .034 .000 4699 
Able to Offer Preferences on Democracy   .002NS .033 .001 4695 
Able to Offer Value Preferences   -.066NS .045 .000 4222 
 
Controlling for age, rural/urban location, gender and lived poverty, as well as cognitive en-
gagement and efficacy.
NS p=>.05, * p=<.05, ** p=<.01 ***  p=<.001   Source : Mattes and Mughogho (2010:17).
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relevant age cohort without higher education, internet use is not much higher
than among the three mass publics in general. Thus, on all the three cam-
puses, access to and acquisition of information about public affairs and poli-
tics is considerably better and more frequent than among the relevant pub-
lics in general and the less educated same age peer groups in their respective
countries.
In terms of actual knowledge about politics, UON students are highly
knowledgeable about the identity of political incumbents at national level
(i.e. the President of the country is correctly identified by 98% of the stu-
dents, the Minister of Finance by 96%, and their local MP by 87%) and to a
lesser extent of student representatives and campus officials (e.g. the Vice-
Chancellor, 83% correct responses, the President of the student body 82%,
and the Dean of Students, 52%) followed in rank order by UDSM and UCT
students. Looking closely at responses to the question about the minister of
finance in comparative perspective, it shows that the UON and UDSM
students are much more knowledgeable about this specific political incum-
bent than their compatriots. Compared to only 12 per cent of Tanzanians, 60
per cent of UDSM students correctly name their Minister of Finance; in
Kenya only 44 per cent of Afrobarometer respondents get the Minister’s
name right as against 96 per cent of the UON students. In South Africa in
contrast, 76 per cent of South Africans identified the longstanding and popu-
lar minister of finance correctly in the 2008 Afrobarometer survey, but only
55 per cent of the UCT students correctly named the former minister or his
successor.7 A similar pattern emerges with regard to students’ knowledge
about key political institutions at national level (such as term limits for presi-
dents) and knowledge about university governing bodies. The number of
years the president can constitutionally hold office is known by 63 per cent
of students at UCT, 72 per cent at UDSM and 84 per cent at UON. The
role of the courts in determining the constitutionality of a law is known to
half of the students at UCT, but to less than a third of UDSM and UON
students.
Initial analyses of Afrobarometer data (e.g. Bratton et al 2005) placed a
great deal of emphasis on the role of respondents’ own understandings of
democracy. The HERANA student surveys found that more than nine-in-
ten students could provide a valid definition of democracy in their own words,
and that almost all definitions carried a positive connotation. In much the
same patterns as the overall population, close to half of the students (47%)
defined democracy in terms of political rights and freedoms; and one-third
(34%) as popular participation and deliberation in politics. Conversely, less
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than one-in-ten provided definitions mentioning ‘equality’, ‘fairness’, ‘jus-
tice’, ‘rule of law’ or ‘good governance’. Moreover, conceptions of democ-
racy as ‘socio-economic development’ or ‘access to basic services’ were
almost completely absent from students’ definitions (1%). In other words,
while the stability and very survivability of multi-party democracy in many
African countries is often under question (and local variations are usually
assessed in the literature in terms of ‘deficiencies’ of political culture), Afri-
can mass publics and the students at the elite universities surveyed by
HERANA can be trusted to know very well what democracy is, and is not
(see Luescher-Mamashela et al. 2011).
Cognitive engagement through access to information and news media
use were among the starting points of both Mattes and Mughogho’s
Afrobarometer and Luescher-Mamashela et al’s student studies. Conversely,
the starting point for the ALP legislators study was to assess MPs’ ‘role
orientations’ or how elected representatives in African legislatures under-
stand and define their job. Combining answers to several open and close-
ended relevant questions, the researchers created valid and reliable com-
posite indices that measure three distinct role orientations: ‘institutionalists’,
‘constituency servants’ and ‘partisans’ (Mattes and Mozaffar 2011).8 They
found that the highly educated MPs of African parliaments were more likely
to see themselves as having an institutionalist role than MPs who had not
completed high school. However, they were no different from other MPs in
terms of the extent to which they saw themselves as constituent servants.
Reflecting the fact that they were less likely to have had any experience in
party organizations prior to entering the legislature, it turned out that highly
educated MPs were far less likely to see themselves as strong partisans
doing the bidding of the political party. These initial bivariate associations
remained even after the application of controls for a range of other poten-
tially important variables such as party membership, age, gender, constitu-
ency characteristics, background experiences, and experience within the
legislature. In fact, after controlling for these variables, formal education
constituted the single strongest explanation of why MPs adopt a more insti-
tutionalist or less partisan orientation.
While the ALP study did not include any test of political information or
news media use, it did measure the extent to which MPs used various mecha-
nisms to gather information necessary to their job. What Mattes and Mozaffar
found was that highly educated MPs were indeed more likely to use the
internet on a frequent basis, use various resources internal to the legislature
such as the parliamentary library, research staff, committee staff or legal
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counsel, and would more likely turn to information resources external to the
legislature, such as civil society organizations or universities, than their less
educated peers. Highly educated MPs were also more likely to have trav-
elled outside of Africa on fact-finding trips. With one exception (using inter-
nal resources), these correlations remained even after the application of the
relevant statistical controls for demographic and experiential factors and
role orientations. The authors also noted that education had an additional
indirect effect via role orientations: that is, education promoted an institu-
tionalist role definition, which in turn also separately and independently pro-
moted the use of the internet and other internal parliamentary resources;
and education reduced partisan role orientations, which in turn promote internet
use but substantially detract from the use of internal resources. Therefore,
Figure 2: Committed Democrats
the study showed that, as with students, better educated MPs not only start
out with increased factual knowledge, but are also more motivated and bet-
ter able to gather additional information than their less educated peers.
Higher Education and Democratic Values
Replicating findings based on earlier rounds of the Afrobarometer, Mattes
and Mughogho (2010) confirmed that education had a positive and sizable
impact on commitment to democracy (measured as consistent preference
for democracy and rejection of presidential dictatorship, military rule and
one-party rule), both directly and indirectly, through news media use and
Source: Luescher-Mamashela et al. (2011:57)
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political information, each of which also had a positive impact. They also
examined the link between education and a range of other democratic val-
ues, measured as support for various democratic qualities such as critical
citizenship, the rule of law, freedom of expression, political equality, gender
equality, bureaucratic and electoral accountability, as well as opposition to
corruption. Again, they found that education had a notable impact on peo-
ple’s stated willingness to demand accountability from intransigent bureau-
crats. Yet, across the rest of these values, the total impact of education (as
well as of news media use and political information) was negligible to non-
existent in statistical terms. While formal education generally increased the
extent to which citizens supported these democratic principles, the overall
size of the impact was almost always very small. Indeed, more educated
respondents were less likely to favour a universal, equal franchise, or to
support the rule of law.
In general, cognitive factors seem to have very little to do with the ques-
tion whether or not Africans held democratic values or predispositions. Com-
pared to school leavers, those who had attended university were very slightly
more likely to support freedom of expression. But they were less likely to
believe that everyone should have an equal vote, or to say that elected lead-
ers should be governed by public opinion (rather than their own beliefs).
Overall, it turned out that there was virtually no difference between high
school graduates and those who had attended African universities across a
broad range of democratic values.
Consistent with the Afrobarometer findings, the student surveys found
that only a minority of students at UDSM (36%) and Nairobi (45%) could
be described as fully committed democrats (e.g. who always prefer democ-
racy and reject each non-democratic alternative), and in the national com-
parison the students from these two universities also emerged as less com-
mitted to democracy than their respective national age cohorts of youth with
no higher education, as well as their mass publics in general (see Figure 2).
Only at UCT and in South Africa was the picture somewhat different. 54
per cent of UCT students qualified as committed democrats who consist-
ently demand democracy; this figure is considerably higher than the South
African mass public (where only 35% were fully committed to democracy)
or their age peers without HE (32%). Notwithstanding this, demand for key
freedoms such as free speech, press freedom, and freedom of association,
is high among students of all campuses (and highest at UCT), albeit not as
unfettered freedoms: on the one hand, the majority of students reject or
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even strongly reject all statements that suggest government should be able
to curtail free speech, freedom of association or press freedom; on the other
hand, the corresponding positive statements that suggest unfettered freedoms
receive varied levels of support. Provided that the students more strongly
disagree with statements that limit political freedoms than they agree with
unfettered rights to free speech, free association and press freedom, their
responses suggests a rather nuanced demand for these freedoms compat-
ible with students’ conceptions of democracy (as noted above), whereby
democracy is not simply conceived as a political system of rights and freedoms
but one which also involves citizen participation in decision-making (and
perhaps other kinds of citizen responsibilities and citizenship duties)
(Luescher-Mamashela et al. 2011).9
Higher Education and Critical Citizenship
If highly educated African citizens are not especially likely to hold more pro-
democratic dispositions, does higher education at least contribute to the like-
lihood of citizens giving critical evaluations of the political and economic
performance of their country? The analysis of Afrobarometer data con-
ducted by Mattes and Mughogho examined the impact of formal education,
along with news media use and political information, on a wide range of
political and economic performance evaluations. Three important findings
emerged. First, taken together, formal education, media use and political
information had sizeable impacts on how those people with opinions evalu-
ated their personal economic conditions, the status of political rights in the
country, and the degree of trust they placed in government institutions and
state media. Education had an especially strong direct effect relative to that
of information and news media. Indeed, with one exception, formal educa-
tion consistently had a statistically significant and negative impact on all
performance evaluations. Thus, increased schooling not only enables Afri-
cans to offer more opinions, it also allows them to offer more critical opin-
ions. At the same time, the contributions that formal schooling made toward
enabling a more critical citizenship could potentially be mitigated by the con-
founding effects of higher levels of political information and, sometimes, the
effects of news media use. That is, while education (holding constant media
use and information) made people more critical of performance, formal edu-
cation simultaneously led people to acquire greater amounts of political in-
formation, which in turn (holding constant education and news media use)
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made people consistently less critical, and thus more forgiving of govern-
ment performance. Moreover, while higher levels of news media consump-
tion sometime induced greater criticalness, it more often had the opposite
effect of making people less critical (possibly either because high media
users were consuming news produced largely by state-owned media or be-
cause increased levels of information decreased mistrust). The most con-
sistent impacts of higher education (over and above the effect of going to
high school) were to be seen in this area. Controlling the other elements of
cognitive awareness and demographic factors, Mattes and Mughogho found
(with one exception) that university attendees were consistently more criti-
cal of the performance of their economies, governments and political re-
gimes. At the same time, the size of the impact was quite limited, however.
Consistent with these findings, the student surveys found that the major-
ity of third year students at all three institutions felt that their countries were
either ‘not a democracy’ or a ‘democracy with major problems’ (UON,
86%; UDSM, 66%; and UCT, 52%); results indicating that far more stu-
dents were critical of regime performance than their age peers without HE
or the respective mass publics. The majority of students at the two East
African universities were also dissatisfied with the way democracy worked
in their country (UON 87%; UDSM 70%). As against this, 58 per cent of
Kenyans in general and 57 per cent of the Kenyan age cohort without HE
were not satisfied with regime performance (i.e. the way democracy worked
in their country), and only 29 per cent of Tanzanians and 30 per cent of the
respective age cohort without HE in Tanzania. At UCT, a majority of stu-
dents was ‘fairly’ or ‘very satisfied’ (57%), a figure that was slightly more
positive than South Africans in general (49%) and their South African peers
without HE (44%). Furthermore, Luescher-Mamashela and colleagues make
a useful contribution by developing the concept of the potentially
‘transformative democratic citizen’: that is, someone who prefers democ-
racy, but is critical or highly critical of the current extent of democracy and
impatient to see regime change. As may be expected from the political de-
velopments in Kenya at the time of the survey, a majority of third-year
students at UON (61%) emerge as potentially transformative democrats,
compared to just under half at UDSM (47%) and four-in-ten at UCT (40%).
In each case, the students were significantly more likely to be critical and
impatient transformative democrats than their respective fellow citizens or
their age peers without HE (see Figure 3).
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In quite concrete terms, the ALP study adds to the finding that highly edu-
cated MPs tend to be more critical of the performance of the legislature,
that they are also more likely to demand various kinds of reforms. The
survey asked MPs whether they would support or oppose a wide range of
potential reform bills, ranging from enabling the legislature to initiate legisla-
tion, amend executive bills, raise and lower taxes, pass bills over the objec-
tion of the executive, and increase the amount of executive oversight. While
higher education made no direct impact, Mattes and Mozaffar detected a
strong indirect impact because MPs with institutional orientations, as well as
those MPs who actively use parliamentary resources to gather information,
were much more supportive of reforms to strengthen the legislative arm of
government over that of the executive.
Higher Education and Democratic Action
In response to more participatory conceptions of democracy and various
conceptualisations of ‘active citizenship’, each study examined in some way
the degree to which higher education translated into relevant forms of demo-
cratic action. The Afrobarometer study demonstrated that formal education
made positive, statistically significant but small contributions to membership
Figure 3: Tranformative Democrats
Source: Luescher-Mamashela et al. (2011: 80).
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in civic groups, as well as contacting formal and informal leaders by citi-
zens. Moreover, any positive contribution that education made to demo-
cratic participation appeared to level off after high school. Furthermore,
when it comes to partisan identification, higher education had negative ef-
fects: African citizens with a university degree were less likely than high
school graduates to identify with a political party. And while they were more
likely to take part in protest and contact formal officials, the absolute size of
the difference was relatively small. Lastly, higher education played no role
in encouraging people to join civil society organizations, become involved in
community affairs, or vote.
Active organisational membership, formal and informal political action
and voting were also investigated for those being in higher education in the
HERANA student surveys. In terms of voting, the students at Nairobi (79%)
and UCT (62%) both reported having voted in the most recent national
election at rates about equal to their less educated age cohort, while UDSM
students reported voting at lower rates. However, active organisational
membership in an off-campus, non-religious association was much higher
among students at UCT (43%) and UDSM (53%) and at least slightly higher
among UON students (48%) than amongst their respective national age
cohorts (11% in South Africa; 29% in Tanzania; 43% Kenya). Moreover,
students were more likely to be leaders of off-campus voluntary secular
organisations than their respective age cohort without HE (29% of UON
students as against 12%; 15% of UDSM students versus 1% only; and 13%
of UCT students compared to 4% of the South African age cohort). In
addition to that, students are of course extensively involved in campus-based
student organisations whereby 63 per cent of students at UON, 71 per cent
at UDSM and 57 per cent at UCT reported active membership or leader-
ship of an officially recognised student organisation on campus. And except
for UCT students, who participated in national demonstrations (17%) about
as frequently as South Africans in general, students from the East African
universities were around twice as likely to take part in an off-campus pro-
test as their respective compatriots (Nairobi: 28%; UDSM: 36%).
On the basis of these and related findings, Luescher-Mamashela and
colleagues concluded their investigation by developing the concept of the
‘active democratic citizen’ for the purpose of the student surveys: that is,
someone who always prefers democracy and either participates in protests
or demonstrations on or off campus or acts in a formal capacity as an offi-
cial leader/leader of an association on or off campus. By this definition, the
active citizens represent just over one-third of the final year student body at
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UDSM (35%), one-quarter at Nairobi (27%) and one-fifth at UCT (22%).
The surveys showed that, compared to their respective national age cohorts
of youth without HE, students were considerably more likely to be active
citizens at an early age (Tanzanian cohort: 16%; Kenyan cohort: 14%; South
African cohort: 8%). Therefore, while students do not necessarily prefer
democracy more than the mass publics or their less educated age peers, the
big difference that emerges from the surveys is that those students who do
so are much more likely to protest and take leadership positions in organisa-
tions on or off campus.
The relevant forms of participation and pro-democratic action for MPs
are different than ordinary citizens, of course. Thus, the ALP study asked
MPs rather about a range of relevant legislative behaviours. First of all, they
examined how much time MPs allocated amongst the activities that under-
pin competing key legislative functions: committee work (oversight), con-
stituency work (constituency service and representation), plenary work (law-
making) and party work (see Table 3). They found few linkages between
higher education and time allocation with regard to committee work, con-
stituency work, or plenary work. However, controlling for role orientations
and other demographic and experiential factors, highly educated MPs –
reflecting their reduced party backgrounds and partisan role orientations –
were far less likely to devote time to party work. But they also found an
important indirect impact of formal education through institutionalist and
partisan role orientations. MPs who see themselves as institutionalists were
more likely to devote time to committee and plenary work, and less likely to
devote time to party work. In contrast, those who see themselves foremost
as representatives of their party were less likely to devote time to constitu-
ency work and far more likely to devote time to party work. Lastly, because
of their central importance to democratic politics and to neo-patrimonialism
in African politics, the ALP survey devoted another set of questions to MP
activities in their constituency. Focusing only on the frequency with which
MPs travelled to the constituency when the legislature was in session, and
how long they stayed, they found that highly educated MPs (controlling for
other factors) travelled home substantially less often, and stayed fewer days
when they did travel home.
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Conclusions
Taken together, the findings of the three HERANA studies suggest that
Africa’s schools and universities have paid democratic dividends. Based on
attitudes and values measured across 18 countries in 2005-2006, the analy-
sis of Afrobarometer data demonstrates several important effects of formal
education on citizens. Its findings are in parts confirmed, in parts nuanced
and put into perspective by the student surveys conducted at three premier
African universities and the ALP studies with MPs of eleven national legis-
latures in Africa that completed the set of HERNANA democracy studies.
Mattes and Mughogho’s study (2010) has shown that formal education both
enables and stimulates Africans to make greater use of the media to get
news about politics. It facilitates citizens’ acquisition of the basic informa-
tion that allows them to make sense of the larger political system. Citizens in
Africa with higher levels of schooling are generally also more likely to de-
velop preferences and adopt more readily critical stances toward regime
and government performance. Finally, higher levels of schooling also lead
Africans to demand democracy. However, beyond a preference for democ-
racy over other regimes, educated Africans are not any more likely to hold
other democratic orientations. Education also makes only a limited contribu-
 Committee Work Constituency Work Plenary Work Party Work 
Constant 13.4**** 45.1*** 17.1*** 12.0*** 
Formal Education NS NS NS -.132** 
Rural Constituency NS .104* NS NS 
Religiosity NS -.107* NS NS 
Local / Provincial Experience NS -.110* NS NS 
Party Leadership Experience NS NS .229*** NS 
Committee Chair Experience .193*** NS NS NS 
Years MP NS NS NS NS 
List PR .237***    -.282*** NS .368*** 
Institutionalist Orientation .191***    -.227*** .104* NS 
Partisan Orientation NS -.128* NS .200*** 
Constituent Orientation NS NS NS NS 
Adj. R2 .122 .161 .056 .227 
N 376 374 376 366 
 
Table 3: Explaining MPs’ Time Allocation
Controlling for age, gender, and party. Source: Mattes and Mozaffar (2011: 12).
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tion to political participation – except in the case of students who are cur-
rently in higher education, as the student surveys show.
The Afrobarometer study also shows that most of these impacts are
largely a reflection of the great differences between those with little or no
formal education and those who have finished high school. African citizens
who go on to university show few advances in various measures of demo-
cratic citizenship beyond that displayed by high school graduates. They dis-
play few statistically significant, and even fewer substantively important
differences with high school graduates in terms of political information, news
media consumption, political participation, articulateness or pro-democratic
values. It is only in the area of evaluations of the performance of the economy,
the government and the larger democratic regime that African citizens with
higher education are significantly more critical, though the size of the differ-
ences are small in the mass public survey (but substantial in the comparison
between students and non-students of the same age cohorts).
Having started the HERANA investigations into the nexus of higher edu-
cation and democracy with the Afrobarometer study, Mattes and Mughogho
concluded in 2010 with an observation and a question. The observation is
that even with the enormous challenges faced by Africa’s schools, students
who move up the educational ladder and complete high school manage to
acquire more political knowledge, develop firmer opinions, and adopt more
critical perspectives. The question that emerged, however, was why do we
see so little further democratic dividends amongst those who have managed
to get a higher education? The results of the student surveys gain some
purchase toward addressing these questions. While current students at the
universities of Cape Town, Dar es Salaam and Nairobi are no more inter-
ested in politics than their fellow citizens, nor more demanding of democ-
racy, they do exhibit a range of other important democratic advantages.
They display far higher levels of political discussion and news media use
(with huge advantages in terms of internet use). They display high levels of
political knowledge. The students also tended to have higher rates of active
membership in off-campus secular organization (over and above associational
involvement on campus), as well as far higher self-reported rates of organi-
zational leadership. Lastly, students are also far more critical of the per-
formance of democracy in their respective country. Indeed, Luescher-
Mamashela et al (2011) show that students at these universities are far
more likely to be dissatisfied democrats eager to see pro-democratic regime
change (or what the authors call ‘potentially transformative democrats’), as
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well as active democrats, who combine support for democracy with formal
and/or informal political participation.
These effects are not only visible through a comparison of the students
with their respective national publics, but also by a comparison of students
with fellow nationals of the same age cohorts but who have not been ex-
posed to higher education. This second comparison is important because it
shows that it is not youthfulness that accounts for the more critical and
activist orientation of students in politics, and suggests that it is rather what
they bring to these universities, or what occurs at these universities, that
accounts for these differences. Hence the authors concluded by posing two
alternative interpretations of the data, neither of which can be fully corrobo-
rated with the existing data. On one hand, the increased availability of news
media, especially internet, increased frequency of political discussion and
ample opportunity for participation and leadership in campus organizations
may mean that these universities effectively function as political ‘hothouses’
whereby the high levels of intense involvement in university and public af-
fairs may wither and disappear once students leave the peculiar environ-
ment offered by the university. On the other hand, the findings also indicate
the potential of universities acting as effective ‘training grounds’ for demo-
cratic leadership with potential ‘spill-over’ effects into off-campus political
activity and a more critical outlook on politics.
The broader interpretation of these findings, that current students at these
three African elite universities display a number of democratic advantages
over fellow nationals in general and those of the same age cohort but with-
out higher education, confronts a range of questions. That is, should we
emphasize the ‘recency’ aspect of these findings and conclude that the role
of higher education in citizenship development is improving in Africa (e.g. in
terms of students’ exposure to key democratic values, skills, and practices;
increased access to information through the internet and other new tech-
nologies)? Or should we focus on the ‘elite’ angle and conclude that these
effects are peculiar to either the unique characteristics of the students re-
cruited into these universities and/or the type of teaching that these institu-
tions have always offered? The available evidence does not permit us to
make a conclusive decision at this point but it opens up exciting new leads
for further enquiry. For instance, the HERANA findings suggest further
investigations into the practical ways in which African universities already
realise their potential as ‘training grounds for democracy’ using a broad
range of methodologies.
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Mattes and Mozaffar (2011) of the ALP surveys uncover perhaps the
strongest impacts of higher education of the three studies. Across members
drawn from eleven legislatures in sub-Saharan Africa, they demonstrate
that highly educated MPs bring with them important social and political char-
acteristics and experiences that enhance their performance as effective
legislators (though their lack of partisan background may reduce their ef-
fectiveness by isolating them politically). University educated MPs are more
likely to see themselves as representatives of the interests of their legisla-
tive institutions, rather than their constituents or political party. In turn, both
formal education and its consequent role orientations combine to lead highly
educated MPs to devote more time to activities that advance the interest of
the institution, to some degree in plenary session but much more importantly
in the committee, and less time toward their party and constituency. They
are also more likely to use the resources of the institution to gather addi-
tional information about bills and budgets, and use that information to depart
from under the yolk of their party leaders on occasion. Finally, these two
forces also combine to make highly educated MPs the prime constituency
of legislative reform and legislative strengthening.
The university experience seems to enable these MPs to make sense of
the unique complexities of the legislature, which require MPs to balance
multiple competing legislative functions. This might reflect the knowledge
and analytic skills acquired through a university degree, and especially a
postgraduate degree. Or, it may reflect the fact that universities are them-
selves highly complex organizations and that negotiating undergraduate and
postgraduate degrees provides graduates with key advantages in handling
life in the institutions where they work, including legislatures. Or it may be,
in effect, of the extensive organisational membership and leadership experi-
ence that students acquire on and off campus reported in the student sur-
veys. Again, current evidence cannot answer these questions conclusively;
we can just assume that it is most likely a combination of all the above.
The HERANA surveys have therefore provided important evidence on
the roles of higher education in the deepening of democracy in Africa. On
the one hand, highly educated citizens in Africa are significantly more criti-
cal of the performance of their economy, government and larger democratic
regime, and they are better informed and obtain their information about poli-
tics from a greater variety of news media than less educated citizens. The
same democratic advantages are already evident among students at univer-
sity level. On the other hand, higher education has seemingly no positive
impact on support for democracy per se and higher levels of political partici-
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pation observed among students disappear once the graduates leave the
university. In our view, if political participation can be sustained and demo-
cratic values are more successfully inculcated at university level, African
graduates may come to play the crucial role we observe already among
university educated parliamentarians in African legislatures: namely, that
through their commitment to democracy and knowledge of politics, the ana-
lytic skills acquired through a university degree and insight gained into the
operation of complex institutions, African graduates may come to act as
effective democratic ‘institution builders’ in state and civil society and thus
play a crucial role in the democratisation of politics in Africa.
Notes
1.        We would like to acknowledge the support of the US Partnership for Higher Education
in Africa - in particular the Ford Foundation, the Carnegie Corporation of New York,
the Rockefeller Foundation and the Kresge Foundation – which contributed funding
and expertise for the HERANA studies. We are also grateful to the Afrobarometer for
availing data and certain research instruments to the researchers of the studies on
which this article is based. Merci to Ms Magalie Bertrand for the translation of the
abstract. Professor Mattes was a Fellow of the Stellenbosch Institute for Advanced
Studies (STIAS) when the article was written.
2.         The surveyed countries (Afrobarometer Round 3) were: Benin, Botswana, Cape Verde,
Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria,
Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe (for more informa-
tion about the Afrobarometer, see www.afrobarometer.org).
3.        The sample for each university survey was stratified by faculty, whereby proportion-
ate to the size of third-year student enrolment in each faculty, a number of third year
courses was randomly selected. Questionnaires were administered in class by the
researchers. In addition, a subsample of student leaders was constructed and inde-
pendently surveyed. A total of 1, 411 students completed the questionnaires; statisti-
cally re-weighted to 400 responses per university (Total N=1200). By the time Luescher-
Mamashela et al. (2011) completed their report, a related study at the University of
Botswana was still underway (see Kgosithebe forthcoming)
4.        The relevant age cohorts were for Kenyans the ages 22-25 years, South Africans 20-
23 years, and Tanzanians 22-26 years (Luescher-Mamashela et al. 2011: 19).
5.      The countries included in the ALP study were Ghana (2010), Kenya (2008-2009),
Lesotho (2010), Malawi (2008), Mozambique (2008), Namibia (2009), Nigeria (2009),
South Africa (2009), Tanzania (2009), Uganda (2009) and Zambia (2007). The in-
tended sample size in each country was n=50. The realized sample sizes differed in
Kenya (n=47), Malawi (n=49), Namibia (n=37), Nigeria (n=57), and Zambia (n=51).
By the time Mattes and Mozaffar completed their analysis, surveys were still ongoing
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in Lesotho and South Africa; their study reported the result from 27 and 32 interviews
respectively.
6.       While the survey was conducted at UCT, a new cabinet was under formation and thus
some students named the longstanding outgoing minister while others named the
new incoming minister as incumbent; moreover, many answered ‘know but can’t
remember’.
7.     ‘Constituency servants’ is measured on a four-point scale: They see constituency
service or representation as most important part of job; as the most rewarding part of
job; as the most important influence on position taking; and say MPs should follow
wishes of constituency over those of party. ‘Partisans’, as measured on a 0 to 4 scale,
see their party as most the important influence on position taking; say MPs should
follow wishes of party over those of their constituency; say MPs should follow
wishes of party over national interest; and follow wishes of party over personal
conviction. ‘Institutionalists’, measured on a scale from 0 to 5, see law-making, debat-
ing or oversight as the most important part of job; and as the most rewarding part of
job; they see the national interest or own knowledge as most important influence on
their positions; say MPs should follow the national interest rather than their party;
and say MPs should follow their personal conviction rather than the party (compare
Mattes and Mozaffar 2011:10).
8.       The ALP study did not ask MPs for their attitudes towards democracy per se, assu-
ming (perhaps without good reason) that elected representatives would uniformly
provide pro-democratic answers.
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